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BOOK REVIEWS
JUSTICE REED AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THE RELIGION CLAUSE.

By F. William O'Brien, S.J. 1 Washington: Georgetown University Press,
1958. Pp. xi, 264. $5.00. Father O'Brien has written a painstaking and
well-documented study of a justice whose work in the shaping of our
constitutional law has often been overlooked. The book shows both the
good and the bad points that are to be expected in the work of the
political scientist addressing himself to legal topics.
The political approach to Reed's opinions develops a persuasive synthesis of his views in terms of a commitment to pluralist and federalist
democracy, with a strong faith in the ability of Americans to solve
equitably on a local level the more or less inevitable irritations of communal living. This faith seems more admirable as we deal more with
cases involving true compromises, less so as we deal with cases in which
the element of coercion is stronger, or where the conscientious commitments involved are less susceptible of compromise. Thus, Father
O'Brien parts company with Reed when it comes to the latter's opinions
in the two flag-salute cases. This reviewer would be disposed to part
company with both of them somewhere among the cases involving the
efforts of the Jehovah's Witnesses to propagate their faith. At the same
time, as a variable to be considered in judicial determinations about civil
rights, Reed's pluralism is well worth taking into account, and we are
indebted to Father O'Brien for pointing it out.
We are also indebted to him for two provocative, if not wholly unanswerable, points of a more technically legal nature. One concerns the
possible applicability to establishments-of-religion of the "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" test that was adopted in Palko v. Connecticut2
and applied generally in cases involving procedural due process. He
argues that nothing implicit in the concept of ordered liberty is violated
by religious establishment such as that existing in England. A fortiori, it
would seem this is true of the plan under consideration in McCollum v.
Board of Education.3 This argument, of course, is connected with the
ideas of pluralism and judicial restraint. It is the lightness of the burden
the religious establishment imposes on the non-members that can be
pointed to as making the establishment tolerable. The judiciary, in other
words, should not interfere with the adjustments made in the local community unless someone is hurt by them. Herein lies the most telling
objection to the majority decision in McCollum - a technical rendering
of it might be that the substantive content of due process is irrelevant unless someone is deprived of life, liberty, or property. This objection could
have been dealt with in terms of standing, but was not properly reducible
to considerations of judicial administration.
The other of these points involves the possibility of a connection
4
between the use of religious freedom in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral
and the familiar debate about whether the protection of the fourteenth
amendment is available to a corporation. Father O'Brien points out that
there is no showing that the interference of the state with the right of the
1 Member of the faculty, Georgetown Univ.
2 302 U.S. 319 (1937).

3 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
4 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
(510)
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Russian Orthodox Church to apply its own canon law to its internal disputes in any way affected the liberty of any particular person to worship
as he pleased. The point is, as has been suggested, provocative. Father
O'Brien in posing it, however, ignores both the history of the struggle of
hierarchicl -churches to free themselves from the American legislative
and jucicial bias for congregational government, and the methodological
connection between freedom to adhere to a hierarchical church and legal
recognition for the authority of the hierarchy over the adherents. One
wonders if Father O'Brien would have asked the same question in the
same way if the foreign prelate whose rights were involved were not the
Communist-dominated Moscow Patriarch.
The bad points in the book arise from the same source as the good
points. For all his careful scholarship, for all his impressive array of
legal bibliography, Father O'Brien never quite escapes from the fact that
his materials are unfamiliar to him, and his professional preoccupation
different from that of lawyers. He consistently underplays the methodological, administrative, or institutional aspects of any problem, and
treats as peripheral issues that lawyers would regard as central.
A particularly striking example of this is his treatment of the problem
of prior restraint in the Jehovah's Witnesses cases. In his first chapter,
dealing with Lovell v. City of Griffin,5 Schneider v. Irvington,6 and
Cantwell v. Connecticut,7 he does not mention .it
at all, but says "The
Lovell, Schneider, and Cantwell decisions were products of the Court's
deep suspicion of discretionary power in the hands of local assemblies or
administrators." He thus sets the stage for his plea for decentralized
government. Later, when he comes to Jones v. Opelika,8 he points out
that Reed distinguishes Lovell, Schneider, and Cantwell on the basis of
prior restraint, then hurries on to say "Justice-Reed makes an even more
important observation when he notes the difference between a regulation
of the religious rite and one which touches operations merely incidental
to it."' Prior restraint is sinilarly ignored or brushed aside throughout
the discussion. Nowhere is there an attempt to consider the real problems
to which the doctrine is addressed, or the possibility of its furnishing an
integrating element for the line of cases or some significant part of them.
At other times, Father O'Brien takes an excessively technical view of
law. In his discussion of Reed's opinions in Jones v. Opelika and Murdock v. Pennsylvania,'0 for instance, he is much impressed with the distinction Reed makes between religious activities as such and commercial
or quasi-commercial activities calculated to support the ministers of
religion. He does not state, let alone answer, Douglas' point that "freedom of religion is not reserved to those who can pay their own way."
Reed's opinion, standing beside -Douglas', is a rational choice between
competing alternatives, although this reviewer would not agree with it,
but the-saie opinion, as stated by Father O'Brien, stands alone as a

5
6
7
8

303 U.S. 444
308 U.S. 147
310 U.S. 296
316 U.S. 584
9 Text at 21.
10 319 U.S. 105

(1937).
(1939).
(1940).
(1942).
(1943).
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serious oversimplification. What emerges is a picture of a distinction discerned by Reed and those who voted with him, which the rest of the
Court was too obtuse to understand.'" Father O'Brien ends his discussion
by interpreting this whole line of cases in political terms: "In his opinions
in Opelika and Murdock, Mr. Justice Reed evinced a greater regard for
federalism than
was manifested by several others on the Bench in the
'
12
same cases.'
Another example of an insufficiently subtle approach to legal technicalities is furnished by Father O'Brien's treatment of the "silence-ofCongress" argument in Girouard v. United States.'3 In that case, it may
be recalled, the Supreme Court made it possible for a conscientious objector to become a citizen of the United States, by overruling earlier cases
that had interpreted the oath of allegiance as a commitment to bear arms.
Three justices, Reed among them, dissented on the ground that Congress
had repeatedly been urged to change the result of the earlier cases, but
all such proposals had died in committee, and that Congress had since
enacted a comprehensive revision of the Nationality Act, without making
any change in this regard. The argument of the dissenters here is a respectable one on which reasonable men may differ. Father O'Brien is
not to be blamed for accepting it, but he seems to embrace it a good deal
too warmly. There is a powerful moral force behind the result reached by
the majority in Girouard- a moral force that is entitled to consideration
even by those who are unwilling to give it dispositive weight in the particular legislative context. Father O'Brien disregards this in a way that only
a positivistic jurisprudence could approve. Nor is he at all fair to Douglas
when he ignores the articulation of this moral element in the latter's
majority opinion, and refers to "an ingenious interpretation of one of the
amendments adopted in 1942,"' 14 as if Douglas intended to stand or fall
on this.
Even on the technical level he attempts to deal with, Father O*Brien's
legal analysis is far from satisfactory. Thus, in his discussion of Reed's
dissent in McCollum, he takes the distinction-between "purposeful" and
"direct" aid and other aid-with which Reed summarizes his whole position, and suggests as a "slight" criticism that the whole distinction is invalid. He supports this invalidity by stating an a priori definition of what
is "nonpurposeful," and then showing that not all of Reed's examples of
practices that have been considered valid fall within this definition. One
more schooled in legal analysis would instead have used the examples to
clarify the definition of the terms. Father O'Brien's definition of "nonpurposeful" aid is aid "given by the government for a purpose altogether
other than religious."' 5 This reviewer would suggest that "nonpurposeful"
aid is calculated not to achieve some purpose other than religious, but to
provide the religious citizen with the same kind of aid a government
anxious to serve the people provides for other conceptions of the pursuit

11 A suggestion by a former law clerk of Stone's that might have led to a more
subtle interpretation of these cases is dismissed with a footnote reference to another
case, with no indication of how the other case disposes of it. Text at 24.
12

Text at 32.

13

328 U.S.61 (1945).
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15

Text at 54.

Text at 195.
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of happiness. Such an interpretation accords with the examples Reed
gives; this fact seems to warrant some confidence that it is nearer what
Reed is driving at than is another interpretation the examples refute. 16
To sum up, this book, despite the valuable insights it contains here and
there, is basically a work of legal analysis by an amateur. The failure of
the author to grasp the subtleties of legal technique leads him to vacillate
between a political interpretation of law on the one hand and a positivistic
interpretation on the other. That so much careful reasearch by a scholar
obviously competent in the field of political theory should fail to make
more of a contribution to an understanding of the legal materials he deals
with suggests a serious failure of communication between the two disciplines. Clearing this up would lead to the shedding of a good deal more
light on the Supreme Court for everyone concerned.
Robert E. Rodes, Jr.*
16 In a footnote, Father O'Brien suggests another interpretation of Reed's "nonpurposeful" formula, which would avoid "even the slight criticism in, the text ......
Text at 148. This is that government should favor religion "primarily because of the
civil and temporal blessings its teachings and activities concomitantly shower on the
state," a doctrine that Father O'Brien characterizes as "an old and noble tradition."
Whatever may be said about the nobility of this tradition, there is no indication that
Reed supposed it to be the doctrine required by the first amendment when it forbids
an establishment of religion, and less indication that he would have been justified in
doing so. See Barnes v. First Parish, 6 Mass. 401 (1810), in which this doctrine was
used in support of the Congregationalist Establishment.
* Ass't Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.

THE LAWYER AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES. By Frank E. Cooper.'
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1957. Pp. xx, 331. $7.50. Although
administrative agencies and administrative law were unknown long after
most of our basic legal concepts were well recognized and deeply rooted,
they have had and are having such a profound effect that very few areas
of law are untouched by their development. The title of this book is
overly ambitious, for it is obvious that any attempt to deal "with the
problems that the attorney faces in representing clients before administrative tribunals" 2 must limit itself or run the risk of superficiality. But
the book itself avoids both alternatives by treating the fundamental differences beween administrative law and other fidlds of law in very general
terms and then discussing in somewhat more detail the actual conduct
of an administrative proceeding. The bird's-eye view quickly narrows
and the practical problems confronting the lawyer practicing before an
administrative agency are thus given more. attention. A lawyer faced
with his first challenge by an administrative agency will, therefore, find
the book an excellent starting place.
1 Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
2 Text at v.
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Although the author makes the broad charge that "some agencies" do
not give effect to what the legislature intended, he does not level an
accusatory finger at any particular agency. Thereafter he takes the reader
through an agency proceeding. He begins with the initial notice received
by a client from the agency and concludes with the appeal from an
adverse agency decision. However, since he does not confine himself to
any one problem or one agency, it becomes, at times, difficult to follow
the proceeding.
There is usually wide latitude for the exercise of administrative discretion in the application of law by an agency to particular facts. This
makes it difficult to catalogue guiding legal principles or to establish
a precise formula for the solution of the many problems faced by a
respondent involved in an administrative proceeding. Nevertheless, Mr.
Cooper does list the major bases for attack upon unwelcome actions
and briefly refers to the leading cases in the field. This may be a valuable
aid to the lawyer who is seeking a point of departure, but-it oversimplifies, in some instances, the complex considerations which affect
any exercise of discretion.
The author emphasizes throughout his book that counsel appearing
before an administrative agency should, nay must, employ many of the
techniques that he would use when appearing before a- legislative committee. There is a good deal of discussion concerning the necessity for
obtaining the good will of the staff and of the members of the administrative agency, of obtaining a reversal of an initial decision by using
the administrative agency's approach to the problem even though the
lawyer may feel this approach is improper, and of the use of lobbying
techniques. In so far as this analysis of the relationship between the
lawyer and the administrative agency involves an acceptance of the
idea of government by men rather than government by laws, most agency
officials would disagree with the basic premise.
There is no doubt that staff consultation and advice can relieve a
lawyer practicing before an agency of many of his difficulties. 3 But
interpretations issued by an agency, on either a formal or an informal
basis, are often the only way in which a client can be protected. Every
agency action must be responsive to the law under which it operates.
No matter how many years a member of the staff of an agency has
operated under the statute, he invariably turns to a consideration of the
statute before expressing an opinion. Similarly, the members of each
board or commission must depend upon the statute under which they
operate, or the rule promulgated thereunder, for authority. When any
departure from the statute seems required by the "public interest," it is
time to recommend new legislation rather than strain existing legislation
or wrench the language used into an unrecognizable result.
Necessarily, the author refrains from discussing any agency in detail
and uses the major administrative tribunals only to illustrate the way in
which particular problems are handled. This is just enough detail to pique

3 The author of this review was pleased by the book's reference to the
Securities and Exchange Commission as possessing "an outstanding record of accomplishment" in issuing interpretations of security laws. See text at 45.
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the reader's curiosity and not enough to gain a full understanding of any
single agency's practice and procedure.
Myer Feldman*
* Special Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission; Professorial Lecturer
in Law, American University Law School. The Securities and Exchange Commission,
as a matter of 'policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication by any

of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's colleagues upon

the staff of the Commission.

WHEN
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To THE TAX COURT: 'PROCEDURE

AND PRACTICE.

Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 1957. Pp. 316. $4.00. The
federal government today is collecting the amazing sum of about eightybillion dollars a year in federal taxes. There is hardly a transaction that
does not have its tax consequences and potential tax dispute with the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Administrative procedures in the
Revenue Service are provided to settle these disputes where possible but
a large number must be finally determined by the courts. It is here that
the Tax Court of the United States performs its important function. The
Tax Court is the first independent forum where a taxpayer can challenge
the right of the government to extract more tax from him than he has
declared that he owes in his federal tax return; the Tax Court is given
original jurisdiction in deficiency cases. The taxpayer must commence
his action in the Tax Court and against the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue unless he chooses and can afford to pay the government's demands first. If he pays the amount alleged to be due by the government,
he can sue the United States for a refund in a federal district court or
the Court of Claims.
Technically, the Tax Court is an administrative agency under the
Executive Branch of the Government which was created by Congress in
1924 as the Board of Tax Appeals. Its name was changed by Congress
to the Tax Court in 1942 and its sixteen members were designated judges.
Tax Court decisions are reviewed by courts of appeal and the Supreme
Court of the United States in the same manner as are the decisions of
federal district courts. It is in substance a court and conducts its proceedings accordingly. The Tax Court has jurisdiction over income, excess
profits, *estate and gift taxes and is the appeal body from administrative
determinations in renegotiation proceedings. The court is divided into
sixteen divisions of one judge each; and cases are usually heard by a
single judge. Sessions of the court are held in all of the large cities of the
United States. Judges are appointed for a term of twelve years by the
President of the-United States with the advice and consent of the United
States Senate.
In the fiscal year 1957, 5,295 cases were filed with the Tax Court, and
it is anticipated that about 5,800 cases will be filed in 1958. Every lawyer
who fully represents his client will be concerned with the decisions and
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precedents of the Tax Court and will eventually find himself before the
court challenging the government's right to obtain more taxes from his
client.
No man likes to play a dangerous game in the other fellow's back yard
because his opponent is in familiar surroundings; he suffers the uncertainties of being in a strange place. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue is represented in the Tax Court by attorneys in the Office of the
Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service. The Tax Court is their
regular forum and they are able and experienced advocates familiar with
the rules and the know-how of Tax Court practice.
How then can a general practitioner of the law best prepare himself,
in the limited period of time he is usually allowed by his client, to go into
a strange court and meet able opposition in surroundings familiar to
them? The book When You Go To The Tax Courts: Procedure and
Practice is written for the lawyer who in a short time wants to know all
about how a tax dispute arises, his client's right to a forum, how he gets
there, the rules of the court, how and where he can appeal and perhaps
above all, to be familiar with forms and examples of how it is done. How
are the pleadings and briefs set up? Is there an opening statement before
the trial? Is there an oral argument after trial? What rules of evidence
are followed?
This is the Seventeenth Annual Edition covering "Procedure and
Practice Before the Tax Court of the United States," and Commerce
Clearing House has answered all questions that its experience in the tax
field has shown that a novice having his first trial or a veteran trial
lawyer appearing in the Tax Court for the first time should need to know.
The book, however, is more than just a "how to do it" manual. It
contains the Tax Court Rules of Practice, rules for appeal from the Tax
Court to the various circuit courts of appeal, forms used by the Treasury
Department, the Tax Court and circuit courts and a text discussion of
problems involving litigation in the Tax Court annotated with the case
authority. Thus, the book has value for the experienced practitioner who
specializes in taxes. It is an annotated text book, a procedure reference
book, a form book, and a collection in one place of useful information
that is otherwise difficult to obtain quickly. The grouping together in one
chapter of rules of evidence to be used in the Tax Court and the rules
governing the testimony of witnesses make the book a valuable reference
to have at hand during a trial in the Tax Court.
The discussion in the book relating to pleadings in the Tax Court may
be subject to some criticism. Tax problems are complicated and often the
problem involved is not clearly defined or understood by the parties prior
to going to court. A taxpayer, however, has the burden of proof on all
issues except fraud and it is imperative that he fully understands the
issues and his burden in the case. A taxpayer has the right to have the
issues clearly stated and defined in the pleadings prior to the trial of the
case.
The discussion dealing with the Commissioner's answer to a taxpayer's
petition recognizes that the answer is very often little more than a general
denial of the allegations in the petition of the taxpayer. The petition is the
opening pleading and is addressed to the Commissioner's determination
in the notice of deficiency or the so-called ninety day letter. Very often
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the notice of deficiency is not clear or complete so that the issues are not
clearly defined by the pleadings prior to trial. The chapter on the Commissioner's answer states in this case "probably the best way out of -the
situatibn where the taxpayer does not understand the basis upon which
the Commissioner's Counsel intends to rely is to go to him informally
and ask him. Unless there are special circumstances the attorney handling
the case for the Commissioner will be willing to state where he stands."
It is the view of many tax attorneys that the taxpayer should not have
to go to government counsel to ask what the issues are or where the
government stands after the pleadings are complete. Both parties should
know by that time what the fight is about and their position should be
defined and limited by the pleadihgs.
. In 1956, the Tax Court decided the case of Peter and Grace
Licavoli'
wherein the court dismissed the Commissioner's allegation of fraud in
his answer which was based upon a net worth computation -showing
additional unreported income. The taxpayer previously had filed a motion
to make the Commissioner's aihswer more definite and certain, which the
Tax Court'granted. The Commissioner's amended answer was still not
adequate to supply the taxpayer with sufficient knowledge of the net
worth computation. Thereafter, the Commissioner refused to comply
with the court's order to plead further. The Commissioner's pleading of
the affirmative matter was thereupon stricken from the pleading and the
case by the Tax Court. In other recent cases not involving fraud, the
court has granted a petitioner's2 motion to make the Commissioner's
answer more definite and certain.
The foregoing is really a criticism of an attitude on the part of some
that Government Counsel is immune from admitting facts or pleading
other facts that he knows to be true so that the parties can narrow the
issues and in some cases understand the issues in the case. It is not a
matter of the taxpayer's attorney going to government counsel informally
to find out the issues. He has a right to have the issues set forth in writing
in the pleadings and the Tax. Court will back him up in enforcing that
right.
Wesley A. Dierberger*

1 P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. 56,187, aff'd. - F.2d - (6th Cir. 1958).
2 See "Memorandum to Accompany Order" in the cases Appalachian
lec.
Power Co. and affiliated corporations and the Ohio Power Co., Docket Nos. 63152,
63153, and 63394 and discussion at " 5007, CCH TAx CT. REP.
* Member of the Indiana Bar.
-.
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